Abstract-The Virtual Control System Environment (VCSE) is a hybrid simulator that is used to analyze the effects of cyber security vulnerabilities for control systems on the power grid. The VCSE allows a heterogeneous environment of real, emulated, and simulated components which allow the modeler freedom to instantiate components at varying levels of detail necessary for the analysis. Stronger modeling effort can be applied to specific systems under test while the remainder of the environment can be filled in with less labor-intensive elements. The VCSE includes software that federates and automates together capabilities across simulation domains (here, the control system components, their networking, and the power grid).
I. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE
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inferred from the characteristics of the smallest, individual computers. Examining individual constituents of the system is not sufficient to understand the emergent behavior at large scales. Fortunately or not, the techniques that adversaries can use to cause this sophisticated mischief are often complex and arcane. The fortunate aspect is that this requisite sophistication keeps the techniques away from most adversaries. The unfortunate aspect is that it also keeps their discovery and their ability to develop appropriate mitigations away from most security researchers. Making things more difficult is the fact that many of these vulnerabilities must be studied in the application environment (here, electric power systems).
The most widely-used technique that cyber researchers use for deep analysis is hardware-based. Here, investigators purchase and configure control system networks from physical equipment. While very accurate, this approach is problematic because the equipment and tests can be very expensive to acquire, configure, run, and maintain. Given the cost, researchers work with underdeveloped sets of data when formulating conclusions; therefore, it may be easy to miss or over-state key vulnerabilities and, consequently, to under-or over-design protections without addressing the bigger picture. A key part of the risk assessment for cyber control systems is the understanding of vulnerabilities and the failure mechanisms that lead to impacts on the power grid.
The Virtual Control System Environment (VCSE), developed by Sandia National Laboratories, is intended to help address these needs. The VCSE can be conceptualized as a way to link information about threats and attacks to consequence studies -the VCSE bridges the gulf between these other two key components of risk analysis,. The VCSE was developed as a key part of the National SCADA test Bed program, funded by the Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability [1] .
II. VCSE TECHNICAL APPROACH
There are three major domains within the VCSE:
• Control System Components • Networking • Grid Models As a hybrid simulation environment, the VCSE allows modeling at varying levels of complexity for any components within these three domains: Definitions follow for these terms. Here, simulated refers to the nodes represented through simulation tools. These nodes generally uses stripped down or abstracted implementations of the software running on virtualized hardware and hence are easier to setup for typical cases. Emulated nodes, on the other hand, use real software, for instance Cisco IOS (originally Internetwork Operating System), but run on emulated or virtualized machines. Physical components are obvious real software running on real hardware, or other real devices.
Simulated vs. emulated vs. physical (SEP) nodes and experiments have varying degrees of difficulty and cost involved in procurement, configuration and deployment. Simulation node and experiment configuration typically takes the shortest time when compared to the time-intensive and often high monetary expense involved in real-hardware configuration. However, simulation models typically do not implement all functions and incorporate abstractions of the device being modeled. Models used in simulations must also be configured to represent the devices being modeled as closely as possible. The process of obtaining configuration parameters of implemented network devices and transcribing the equivalence into simulation models can be difficult, tedious, and time-consuming. Figure 1 illustrates these concepts within the VCSE (with the addition of human elements, which can include operators and malicious attackers).
III. COMPONENTS OF THE FEDERATED SIMULATOR
A. Simulation Engine
Sandias patented Umbra Framework [2] is a TRL-7 tool that has been successfully applied both within and outside Sandia in a variety of national security, military, physical security, hazardous work, and industrial automation applications. It is an ideal tool for modeling physical and control systems and for interfacing with actual equipment and SCADA system elements. Because the low-level portions of the models are programmed in C++, Umbra scales very well in modeling large systems. Because Umbra includes a powerful scripting language and the ability to configure models using XML files, models can be readily built, used and adapted by analysts who have limited programming skills. While Umbra serves as a fully capable simulation and visualization environment in itself, a key feature of Umbra is in its features that support effective integration with other simulation environments and tools.
B. Networking
Within VCSE, modelers can efficiently utilize OPNET [3] to model complex networks containing many devices and then use OPNETs System in the Loop (SITL) capability to run these simulated networks as parts of large network emulations. These hybrid networks then interact with real networking hardware, route and pass control system and any other Internet Protocol (IP) traffic, block network access using access control lists, and distribute router configurations and even respond accurately to malicious routing protocol attacks and misconfigurations as if the emulated components were real. In short, these hybrid networks look and act like largescale real networks but are implemented at a fraction of their cost.
Sandia has also introduced routers based on Dynamips [4] technology into VCSE as emulated routers. At an interim level of modeling precision, virtual networks and switches within individual hosts can provide network connectivity. Real (physical) routers are also included within VCSE simulations, and each of the networking elements at the various levels of modeling precision operate with each other transparently.
C. Grid Models
Sandia has interfaced Umbra with PowerWorld [5] . In the VCSE, PowerWorld simulates electrical power systems that are controlled from SCADA and control systems. In this integration, Umbra models the RTUs, the terrain, the breakers and the sensors while PowerWorld models the actual flow of electricity through the power system. Using the combined capability, analysts can simulate both cyber and physical attacks (e.g., physically breaking system elements) on the power system.
D. Control System Components
The actual parts of the control systems (the RTUs, relays, PLCs, HMI, etc.) are modeled across the spectrum of SEP. Existing VCSE work has strongly leveraged virtual machines supported by VMWare [6] for components that utilize conventional operating systems. Using this technology, Sandia has built up a library of components which can be applied as necessary within different environments. VCSE also includes simulated components -in VCSE, these are developed as stimulus / response constructs written in C++ code leveraging Umbra APIs and libraries. (Obviously, these simulated components would not be ideal targets for cyber attack investigations, given their reduced level of fidelity. However, many of these simulated components can be deployed using minimal resources to build up the background environment of a simulation.) Finally, like networking components, physical devices can be seamlessly introduced into VCSE.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The VCSE enables important analysis of control system vulnerabilities, which is a crucial step in understanding cyber risk. As a hybrid simulation environment, the approach leverages varying amounts of detail at the simulated, emulated, and physical levels across the key domains for control (devices, networking, and the power grid). VCSE extensively leverages the Umbra software developed at Sandia for federating the system, components as well as building models for simulated components. Overall, an approach like VCSE enables accurate cyber security analysis with reduces investments of funding (as compared to exclusively real testbeds) and time (since simulated and emulated elements can be stored in ready-touse libraries).
